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ABSTRACT OF THE THESIS 
CRIMINAL APPEARANCE AND LEGAL DECISION-MAKING
by
Marlsa Evelyn Collett 
Florida International University, 2000 
Miami, Florida 
Professor Ronald P. Fisher, Major Professor
Previous research has found that people are able and willing to assess whether an 
individual is a criminal or a non-criminal based on facial observations. What has not been 
looked at is whether an attribution o f criminality could influence decisions as verdict 
choice, culpability, or punishment severity. The present study examined the effects of 
target photos that depicted pre-determined “bad guys” and “good guys” on legal decision­
making. Participants viewed a case file o f an armed robbery and attempted murder. Half 
the participants viewed a photo o f a defendant who was previously deemed a “bad guy” 
and the other half a “good guy.” No differences were found in verdict preference; 
however, target photos o f “bad guys” elicited higher estimates o f the future likelihood that 
the defendant would commit this type o f crime than target photos o f good guys. Results 
indicate that target photos are perceived congruent to their pre-determined categories, but 
those perceptions were disregarded and participants based their decisions on other factors 
when making crucial legal decisions.
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Criminal Appearance and Legal Decision-Making 
“He did it. I know it. Just look at him,” is something that many o f us have either 
said ourselves or have heard others say, either in response to a mystery movie depicting a 
crime and many potential assailants or news clips that show the alleged criminal being 
taken away by the police after capture. Judgments like these are made in the absence of 
other relevant information about the person being perceived.
The illustration presented is an example o f physiognomy, which is the practice of 
judging character and other psychological qualities by merely observing faces. 
Physiognomy is an ancient practice with the earliest known work being linked to Aristotle 
(Alley, 1988). Darwin (1872) made mention o f physiognomy and how the contraction of 
different facial muscles could indicate the disposition o f the person. After continuous use 
o f the particular facial muscles, the face would contain conspicuous lines or furrows that 
would display the specific disposition. Sociobiologists have ascribed a purpose to 
numerous facial characteristics (i.e. certain characteristics depict health or fitness; Alley, 
1988). However, scientific literature, with few exceptions, has failed to find relationships 
between normal variations in facial features and psychological characteristics. There is 
good evidence that, even knowing this, the general public continues to believe and in some 
instances, practices physiognomy (Brandt, 1980).
Studies have shown that people tend to make enduring judgments about an 
individual’s personality, occupation, potential behavior, intelligence, and much more, 
based solely on their perceptions o f others’ facial characteristics (e.g. Fiske & Taylor, 
1984; Hamilton, 1981; Schneider, Hastorf, & Ellsworth, 1979). A few studies have 
shown that in some situations people can make accurate judgments o f personality and
social dimensions o f another based simply on photographs (Thornton, 1939; Terry & 
Snider, 1972; Mazur, Mazur, & Keating, 1984). The fact that in some situations people 
may be accurate about an occupational category or a personality characteristic is not as 
interesting as the fact that people are quite willing to make judgments of others based on 
just a photograph. It may be that an individual’s behavior, in this regard, is reinforced by 
the fact that many times he or she is correct and this reinforces the practice of 
physiognomy.
Terry and Krantz (1993) empirically evaluated the salient features involved in 
physiognomy by varying different features o f the face. They specifically examined the 
effects of eyeglasses, men’s facial hair, and women’s hair length on the traits attributed to 
facial appearance. Subjects rated Photo-Ident composites o f target persons using 20 
different pairs o f adjectives (i.e. aloof-caring, bad-good). Results o f the experiment were 
that eyeglasses on both men and women were associated with attributions o f decreased 
forcefulness and heightened mental competence. Beards on men were associated with 
lessened mental competence and women’s long hair was associated with diminished 
forcefulness.
To give another example o f physiognomy and the influence o f different facial 
components, Zebrowitz & Berry (1985) looked at the components ofbabyfacedness and 
the trait attributions o f those components. The researchers found that large, round eyes, 
high eyebrows, and a small chin yielded the perception o f a babyish appearance in 
photographs o f individuals bearing these features. These facial features also elicited 
impressions from participants that the stimulus person was naive, kind, warm, and honest. 
Zebrowitz & Berry (1985) also tested to see if the previous results could be reproduced
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cross-culturally with Korean subjects and found the same results as with the previous 
experiment with American participants. These results demonstrate that impressions of 
baby-faced individuáis are similar across cultures.
Just as in the examples above, other studies on stereotyping and facial appearance 
have shown that judgments made by subjects are highly consensual (Berry & Zebrowitz, 
1988; Browillow & Zebrowitz; Goldstein, Chance, & Gilbert, 1984; Kahlick, Zebrowitz, 
Langlois, & Johnson, 1988; Perrett & Yoshikawa, 1994; Shoemaker, South, & Lowe, 
1973; Terry & Davis, 1976; Terry & Krantz, 1993; Zebrowitz, Voinescu, & Collins, 1996; 
Zebrowitz & McDonald, 1991). Subjects make these judgments in. the absence of any 
other type o f descriptive or historical information about the target except a photograph 
and they seem to agree as to which photograph reveals which personality dimension or 
belongs in which occupational category. One such study by Goldstein, Chance, & Gilbert 
(1984) tested the hypothesis that faces can serve as stimuli that trigger a consensual 
stereotypical response. They displayed facial photographs o f white, middle aged men in 
five separate arrays. They instructed participants that each array contained a portrait o f 
one o f the following “occupations”: mass murderer, armed robber, rapist, doctor, 
clergyman, and engineer. Participants were then asked to choose one picture for each o f 
the six occupations. The results o f the study were that a. small number of portraits were 
often selected as criminals and a small number o f other portraits were often selected as 
non-criminals. Participants’ choices were more highly consensual among the criminal 
occupations (rapist or mass murderer) than the eon-criminal occupations (doctor, minister, 
and lawyer).
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In two different experiments, Shoemaker, South, & Lowe (1973) found a similar 
effect to Goldstein et al. The first experiment was similar to Goldstein et al. in that 
participants were asked to select from, among a set o f twelve photographs the picture that 
looked the most and next to the most likely and the least and next to least likely to have 
committed one o f four types o f crime. The four types o f crimes were pedophilia, murder, 
robbery, and treason. In the second experiment they used contrived vignettes that 
presented ambiguous evidence o f the four types o f crime and had participants evaluate the 
extent o f guilt or innocence o f the fictitious person presented in the vignette (the target 
pictures were not presented at this point). These same participants were then asked to 
view four o f the twelve pictures (either individually or consecutively) and evaluate the 
extent o f guilt or innocence o f the person in one o f the previously read vignettes. 
Shoemaker et al. demonstrated that certain persons in pictures appear guilty o f specific 
crimes. They also found that negative and positive stereotypes are correlated with 
judgments o f guilt or innocence for the four crimes considered for the four crimes 
evaluated. The results also indicated that negative stereotypes were more important for 
appraising guilt than were positive stereotypes for appraising innocence.
A vast majority o f studies in facial stereotyping demonstrate that people are able 
and willing to make judgments o f others based solely on a photograph, but researchers 
have not looked at whether these stereotypical responses influence decision-making. We 
may make judgments o f other people but when deciding critical issues that involve these 
individuals, do these judgments influence our decision-making processes?
Stereotyping has been noted as one o f many different processes used to clarify our 
environment and economize on mental effort (Reisberg, 1997; Fiske & Taylor, 1984).
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Stereotypes function by categorizing a target as part o f a particular group, within which 
there is a basis o f knowledge that has been built. The activation o f a stereotype elicits a 
selective processing strategy in which stereotype-relevant information is attended to and 
processed (e.g. Rothbart, Fulero, Jensen, Howard, & Birrell, 1978; Hastie, 1980;
Locksley, Borgida, Brekke, & Hepburn, 1980; Bodenhausen & Wyer, 1985). Thus, the 
ability o f stereotypes to influence information processing comes from selectively attending 
to only stereotype-congruent information and disregarding all other information about the 
target. Research has demonstrated that stereotypes can fonction as judgment heuristics,
i.e. simplifying rules o f thumb that are used to interpret the behavior of others 
(Bodenhausen & Wyer, 1985). More often than not, our judgement heuristics are correct 
and this reinforces their use. It is this proclivity to use judgment heuristics that leads to 
utilizing stereotypes and stereotyped information when making decisions.
Bodenhausen and Wyer (1985) evaluated the effects o f stereotypes on reactions to 
behavioral transgressions and the recall o f information about the transgression and 
transgressor. Participants read a case file that described the transgression committed by 
the transgressor. The researchers manipulated the name o f the transgressor in order to 
reveal which ethnic group the transgressor belonged to and they manipulated the 
transgression so that it was stereotypically congruent with the transgressor’s ethnic group. 
Participants were asked to judge the probability that the transgression would recur and 
they were asked to prescribe a punishment for the infraction. Participants were also asked 
to recall all the information they could about the case. The results indicated that 
transgressions that are stereotypic o f a transgressor’s ethnic group were seen as more 
likely to recur than non-stereotypic transgressions. Stereotypic transgressions were also
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punished more severely. Recall data show a differential recall o f presented information, 
with stereotypic information more likely to be recalled than non-stereotypic information. 
This suggests that when an applicable stereotype-based explanation was available to 
explain the transgressor’s offense participants were likely to think about this information 
more or view this information as more diagnostic than other information presented. This 
in turn led to a reduced recall o f the information that was not congruent with the 
stereotype elicited. The recall data obtained by Bodenhausen and Wyer support the notion 
o f the “confirmation bias” (Nisbett & Ross, 1980), in which once a stereotype-based 
impression o f the incident and its components wa.s formed participants better recalled 
information that was congruous with the stereotype.
Going beyond ethnic stereotypes, Berry and Zebrowitz (1988) evaluated the 
impact o f facial maturity and the attribution o f legal responsibility. The researchers used a 
simulated trial format and found that a babyfaced individual was found guilty more often 
than the more mature-faced individual on charges stemming from behavior which resulted 
from negligence. Babyfaced individuals were also more often acquitted o f crimes that 
involved intentional criminal actions. The results o f the experiment also yielded evidence 
to show that subjects recommended less severe punishment for babyfaced individuals than 
to mature-faced individuals.
Zebrowitz and McDonald (1991) evaluated the impact o f litigants’ attractiveness 
and facial maturity on adjudications in small claims court. Their results demonstrated that 
facial maturity and attractiveness had a. significant impact on adjudications. As defendants 
decreased in facial maturity (i.e. they increased in baby-facedness) they were more likely 
to win cases 'involving intentional actions and less likely to win cases involving negligent
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actions (Zebrowitz & McDonald, 1991). This is a similar pattern, of results as those 
produced in Berry and Zebrowitz (1988) described previously. As plaintiffs increased in 
attractiveness, they were more likely to win the case. Also, as defendants increased in. 
facial, .maturity they were required to pay larger monetary sums or awards to (specifically) 
baby-faced individuals.
Berry and Zebrowitz (1988) and Zebrowitz and. McDonald (1991) both 
demonstrated that dimensions o f attractiveness and facial maturity play roles in 
adjudication decisions made by participants. Bodenhausen and Wyer (1985) also showed 
that stereotype-congruent behavior plays a role in legal decision-making. Other 
researchers have found that people are able and willing to assess whether an individual 
belongs to either criminal or non-criminal occupations and judge specific trait attributions 
based solely on their observations o f a face. Research on stereotypes and decision-making 
show that people are harsher in their judgments o f culpability and punishment severity 
when behavior is stereotypically congruent with the individual’s racial or ethnic 
background. What research, has not examined is whether faces deemed most likely to be 
armed robbers or murderers are more likely to be convicted, viewed more culpable, 
punished more severely, or deemed more likely to commit a crime that is congruent with 
their perceived criminal occupation. It is interesting to know that people categorize others 
into different criminal and non-criminal occupations, but it is more useful to know whether 
that classification affects decision-making, especially legal decision-making. Do people 
use the stereotype that “bad people do bad things” when it comes to legal decision­
making? This is the purpose o f the present study.
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This study consists o f three experiments. The purpose of Experiment 1 and 2 was 
to identify a set of target pictures for which there is consensual agreement about good and 
bad guy targets. The use o f two experiments to identify target photographs o f good and 
bad guys allowed for convergence o f good and bad guy targets across different 
experimental methods. Experiment 3 tested the legal decision-making o f participants 
when exposed to either the good or bad guy targets.
In the first experiment, participants were asked to look through 60 pictures of 
white males, approximately 25-55 years o f age. This part o f the experiment was 
undertaken in order to identify which o f the 60 pictures participants consensually agree are 
most indicative o f “good” and “bad” guys. The hypothesis o f Experiment 1 is that certain 
faces elicit consensually similar notions that an individual is either a good guy or a bad 
guy, i.e. individuals would feel safe opening the door for one individual over another 
simply based on their appearance.
In the second experiment a separate group o f participants imagined that they were 
managers o f a convenience store and they made a hiring decision about a target individual 
depicted in their file. Two o f the pictures depicted individuals that participants in 
Experiment 1 consensually agreed were bad and the other two pictures depicted 
individuals that participants consensually agreed were good. The purpose of this 
experiment was to converge on the selection o f the target pictures from Experiment 1 by 
using a different experimental method. It was predicted that participants would be more 
likely to hire the target good guy than they would the target bad guy.
In the final experiment participants were shown a criminal case file. The case file is 
ambiguous and when run in mock trials it typically ends up with half of the juries
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acquitting and half convicting the defendant (J.A. Tanford, personal communication, 
February 24, 1998). The case file viewed by participants involved an alleged armed 
robbery o f a convenience store and an attempted murder o f the convenience store 
manager. The material presented to participants was similar in every way except the 
picture o f the defendant. The pictures obtained in the first experiment and then verified in 
the second experiment were used.
Upon completing the case file presentation, participants were asked to fill out a 
questionnaire with several different measures. Measures within the questionnaire 
included: verdict choice; current probability that the defendant committed the crimes 
charged; punishment sentence ranging from no probation or prison time to 25 years in 
prison; and future probability that the defendant will commit the same type o f crime in the 
future. Following those measures, participants indicated the top five most diagnostic 
pieces o f information used in making their verdict decisions. Participants also rated the 
defendant on different personality trait dimensions and recalled as much o f the case file as 
they could remember.
The experimental hypothesis was that participants would be more likely to convict 
the bad guy than the good guy. This is because the behavior depicted in the case file was 
more congruent with the stereotype elicited by the picture of the bad guy (i.e. bad guys do 
bad things) than the good guy. Participants were also expected to be harsher in their 
sentencing o f the bad guy. As for the current and future probabilities that the defendant 
committed or will commit these types o f crimes in the future, I expected that participants 
would rate each o f the probabilities higher for the bad guy than the good guy condition.
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Experiment 1
Method
Participants, Thirty participants were drawn from the Miami, FL area. The 
average age o f the participants was 29 years (SD = 15.41; range = 18-82 years old). 
Slightly over half o f the participants (58%) were female and slightly less than half (43%) 
were male. The participant population was split in terms o f race and ethnic background. 
Nearly half o f the participants indicated they were non-Hispanic white (47%) and the other 
half indicated they were Hispanic white (53%). Nearly two-fifths of the participants had 
high school diploma or less (37%), a little over a quarter had some college (27%), and 
one-third had a college degree and more (30%). Half the participants noted that their full 
time occupation was that o f a student, almost two-fifths noted they were in sales/ 
customer service type jobs (37%), and the remaining (13%) were employed in other fields.
Materials. The target faces were collected from photo lineups conducted by the 
Hollywood, Florida Police Department in. 1991. Photos were limited to white males, 
ranging in age from 25 to 50 years o f age. They were arranged such that participants 
viewed one photo per page, creating 60 pages in the binder. The photos were in random 
order and each o f the participants viewed the pictures in. the same order.
Procedure. Participants were asked to volunteer in a short study that looked at 
people’s feelings and impressions o f other people. Those who agreed to participate were 
asked to look through a binder o f 60 pictures and evaluate their feelings and impressions 
o f the people depicted in the pictures. They were asked to think in terms o f whether they 
would open the door for this individual if the individual were ringing the doorbell asking 
for donations. For each picture, they were asked rate their feelings and impressions o f the
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person depicted in the picture by indicating whether the person impressed them as a 
“good” person, a “bad” person, or it was undetemiinable. They indicated this by writing 
“G” for good person, “B” for bad person, or “M” for mixed or undeterminable in the 
numbered space that corresponded with the picture.
Results
Participants showed a high consensual agreement between which targets appeared 
to be good guys or bad guys (i.e. whether they would open the door for this person if he 
were at their front door). Participants showed higher agreement for the exemplars o f bad 
guys than they did o f good guys in this set o f sixty individuals. Results for the bad guys 
were as follows: Pictures 10 and 20 had the highest consensual agreement as to whether 
they looked like bad guys, i.e. someone the participants would not be likely to open their 
door for (see Figure 1 to view pictures selected and see Table 1 for results).
For the pictures depicting good guys, Pictures 15 and 48 had the highest 
consensual agreement as to whether they looked like good guys, i.e. someone that 
participants felt comfortable opening their door for (see Figure 1 to view pictures 
selected). Consensual agreement as to which pictures depicted good guys was not as high 
as for bad guys, but more than half the participants agreed that Picture 15 and 48 depicted 
good guys (see Table 1 for results).
Discussion
These results are similar to those obtained by Goldstein et ah in that a small 
number o f portraits were often selected as bad guys and a small number o f other portraits 
were selected as good guys. Unlike Goldstein et a l, participants did not then further 
categorize these pictures into criminal or non-criminal occupations. These results, like
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Goldstein et al,, are compatible with the idea that people may be processing perceptual 
stimuli by means o f a non-conscious comparison o f the target face with either an exemplar 
or prototype they have of a good guy or a bad guy (1984),
Overall results for the sixty pictures .indicate that participants were inclined to find 
most o f the pictures to be either bad guys or they had mixed/ undeterminable reactions to 
the pictures. There were very few instances .in which participants felt that a picture 
depicted a good guy. This may reflect the source of these pictures, police photo line-ups. 
More than likely many o f the people depicted in the photos have been arrested or 
suspected for a crime.
Experiment 2
Method
Participants. Thirty-two participants were drawn from different psychology 
classes taught at the North Campus o f Florida International University. The average age o f 
participants was 24.10 years (SD = 3.88; range = 18-34 years old). Participants were 
predominantly female (78%), Race and ethnic background was diverse as nearly one-fifth 
o f the sample (19%) was non-Hispanic white, nearly one-fifth (19%) was non-Hispanic 
black, nearly two-fifths (38%) was Hispanic white, approximately one-tenth of the sample 
was Hispanic black (9%), and the remaining (16%) indicated they were o f Asian descent. 
The majority o f the sample (81%) had at least some college. The remaining one-fifth 
( 19%) had received a college degree. All participants indicated that they were foll-time 
students
Participants were given, extra credit in their psychology classes in return for their 
involvement in this part o f the study. Participants were told that they would be
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participating in a personnel management study that evaluates how managers make 
decisions. Participants were tested in groups o f one to eight people.
Materials. The materials within this portion o f the experiment consisted o f  
instructions to participants; a photocopy of a mock application for employment; a mock 
California driver’s license; and response sheets which included a demographics section 
(Appendix 1 contains a sample o f the materials used in this portion of the experiment).
One o f four different pictures (two pictures depicting “good guys and two pictures 
depicting “bad” guys) was inserted into the photo area of the driver’s license. The 
selection o f the four pictures was pre-detemiined from the outcome of Experiment 1. The 
application is a standard application form that can be found at office supply stores. The 
information filled out on the application form was the same for all four pictures. The 
application listed the current address o f the target (Wayne Walker), previous employers, 
previous education, a list o f references, and the target’s signature attesting to the accuracy 
o f the information provided in the application.
The response section o f the application contained an initial question that asked 
participants to indicate on a scale o f 1 to 10 whether they would hire Wayne Walker (the 
target), 1 indicating that they would be least likely to hire Wayne Walker and 10 indicating 
they would be most likely. After the initial hiring question, participants were asked to 
provide five pieces o f information that were most diagnostic in making their decision. In 
the next portion o f the experiment, participants were asked about particular personality 
traits Wayne Walker might possess. On a scale of 1 to '7 (1 indicating that in no way did 
Wayne Walker possess the trait asked about and 7 indicating that Wayne Walker very 
much possessed the trait), participants were asked to indicate whether Wayne Walker
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possessed the particular trait. The traits were responsible, honest, sincere, reliable, moral, 
conscientious, and .likable. After completing this section, participants indicated what they 
thought this experiment was about. This was an awareness question used to determine 
whether there was a difference between participants who were aware and those who were 
unaware o f the experimental paradigm. The final portion o f the response sheet was the 
demographics section. The demographics asked participants to indicate their age, gender, 
race/ethnic origin, education level, and occupation.
Procedure. Participants were given packets and asked to wait for further 
instructions from the researcher. The instructions were read out loud to participants. The 
instructions indicated that participants should pretend to be a manager o f a convenience 
store and they were reviewing this particular application in order to make a decision as to 
whether they would hire this particular individual for the cashier position. Upon 
completing their review o f the application and the driver’s Ecense they filled out the 
response sheets that followed.
After participants finished filling out the response sheets they were asked to wait 
silently until others in the room had completed their packets. When everyone in the room 
was finished, the packets were collected and the participants were debriefed and thanked 
for their time.
Results
Participants were asked to indicate on a scale of 1 to 10(1 being least likely and 
10 being most likely) whether they would hire the target person. Participants indicated 
they were more likely to hire targets who were initially selected as good guys (M = '7.25, 
SP = 2.02) than they would targets selected as bad guys (M = 4.25, SD = 1.77), t (30) = -
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4.47, SE = .67 (2 < .01).
A one-way multiple analysis o f variance of the personality traits (i.e. the Likert 
scale in which one indicates not possessing the quality asked about and seven indicates 
very much possessing quality) indicated that there were no significant differences between 
the means o f each o f the seven traits for the good or bad guy conditions, all F s  (1,28) < 
1.59.
Participants were asked to write down the most important pieces o f information 
they used in determining their likelihood o f hiring the target. Recall information was 
scored using the criterion that the “general meaning” o f a particular behavior had been 
accurately conveyed by the participant (Rothbart, Evans, & Fulero, 1979). For example, 
if participants wrote, “He never finished college,” this statement was given one point as it 
conveyed a basic piece o f information on the target. There were no differences in amount 
recalled between the bad guy condition (M = 3.69, SD = 1.02) and the good guy condition 
(M =3.88, SD = 0.89), 1(30) = -.56, SE = .34. Recall information was also scored for 
positivity or negativity o f the information. Examples o f positive information are, “He has 
had some college,” and “He has been an attendant at a gas station before.” Examples of 
negative information are, “He has never been a cashier,” and “He was out of work for a 
long time.” There was no difference in the amount o f negative information recalled 
between the bad guy condition (M = 1-81, SD = 1.47) and the good guy condition (M =
1.69, SD = 1.20), 1(30) = .26, SE = .47. There was also no difference in the amount of 
positive information recalled between the bad guy condition (M = .56, SD - 1.09) and the 
good guy condition (M = .44, SD = .96), t (30) = .34, SE = .36.
Participants who indicated they were aware o f the experimental paradigm, were not
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excluded from the analysis of the results, rather separate analyses were run to indicate 
whether there was a difference between the aware and unaware participants. There was a 
marginal difference in likelihood of hiring the target between subjects who were aware of 
the experimental paradigm (M = 5.10, SD = 2.57) and those who were not (M = 6.80, SD 
= 2.15), t (30) = -1.80, SE = .95 (p = .08). Participants who were aware o f the 
experimental paradigm were slightly less likely to hire the target than those who were not 
aware. One anomaly in this awareness data is that participants in the bad guy condition 
were overwhelmingly more likely to be aware (93%) o f the experimental paradigm than 
those in the good guy condition (40%).
Discussion
The premise o f this experiment was to verify the pictures selected in the first 
experiment using alternative methods. Converging with Experiment 1, Experiment 2 
demonstrated that participants reacted differently to the targets in the bad guy condition 
than the targets in the good guy condition. The results indicate that a separate sample o f 
participants, being given a hiring task, were less likely to hire the bad guy target than the 
good guy. Participants demonstrated in this experiment that when given the choice to hire 
the target for the position o f cashier, a position that involves some level o f trust and 
responsibility, participants were less likely to hire the targets in the bad guy condition than 
in the good guy condition. This affirms the selection o f the pictures in the first experiment 
and allows for the implementation o f the third and crucial experiment.
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Experiment 3
Method
Participants. Ninety-three participants were drawn from different psychology 
classes taught at the North Campus of Florida International University. Participants 
averaged 21.80 years (SD = 5.10; range = 1 7 -4 8  years). As in the previous experiment a 
majority o f the sample was female (86%). The racial and ethnic background of the sample 
was diverse: non-Hispanic white (17%), Hispanic white (17%), Asian (17%), non- 
Hispanic black (45%), and Hispanic black (3%). Most o f the sample (88%) had had some 
college experience but had not yet received their degree; the remaining had received their 
college degree and/or had post-graduate experience or degrees (12%). Most o f the 
sample were foll-time students (62%), a little over one-fifth (23%) of the sample were in 
sales or customer service, and the remaining portion of the sample (15%) were in other 
occupations such as law, social service, medical, or education.
Participants were given extra credit in their psychology classes in return for their 
involvement in this part o f the study. Participants were told that they would be 
participating in a jury decision-making study that evaluates how jurors make decisions. 
Participants were tested in groups o f one to five people.
Materials. In the third experiment participants were shown a criminal case file. The 
case file involved an alleged armed robbery o f a convenience store and an attempted 
murder o f the convenience store manager. The case file was selected because when run in 
mock trials it typically ended up with half the mock juries acquitting and half convicting 
the defendant and as such would maximize the likelihood of finding effects o f the 
manipulated variable, facial appearance (J.A.Tanford, February 24, 1998 personal
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communication). The case file included several statements including one from the 
defendant, two separate statements from alibi witnesses for the defense, a statement from 
the detective investigating the case, and a hearing that 'involved questioning of the 
manager o f the convenience store by both the prosecution and the defense. Within the 
case file there were also pictures o f all the major players in the case, maps, fingerprints, 
and various other pieces o f evidence accumulated in the investigation. The material 
presented to participants was similar in every way except the picture of the defendant.
The pictures o f the defendant used in the separate conditions were the ones obtained in the 
first experiment and then verified in the second experiment.
The case file was viewed on Microsoft PowerPoint 7.0. Participants saw slides on 
a 15 in., Dell Computer color monitor and listened to narration that accompanied each 
slide on Altec Lansing ©, multi-media speakers. There were 43 slides in total. For slides 
that contained just one picture, the average picture size was 6.5 in X 6.5 in. and each 
picture was centered on the screen. Slides containing scanned copies o f the pseudo legal 
paperwork involved in a case (i.e. indictments, maps, fingerprint cards, firearm 
registration, etc.) were 7 in. X 7.5 in. and were centered on the screen. The total running 
time o f the presentation was 54 minutes and 45 seconds. The defendant’s photo was 
shown three times for a total viewing time o f 7 minutes and 57 seconds, once at the 
beginning when photos o f all the key players in the case file were introduced (the viewing 
time for these pictures was 7 seconds), during the defendant’s statement (5 minutes and 40 
seconds), and at the end o f the case file when participants were asked to fill out the 
questionnaire (2 minutes and 10 seconds). All other photos, except the judge’s and the 
witness for the prosecution, were shown twice. The judge’s photo was shown four times,
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once at the beginning o f the case file to introduce the case, one time during the 
presentation o f the key players, during the hearing, and at the end of the case file 
presentation. The photo of the defense witness, also the alleged victim, was viewed a total 
o f three times. His photo was viewed during the presentation o f  key players in the case, 
during Ms statement, and in the hearing
At the end o f the presentation participants filled out response sheets (see Appendix 
2). The response sheets began with having participants indicate their verdict choice. 
Following this, participants indicated on a scale o f zero to one hundred percent what their 
personal estimation was o f the probability that the defendant committed the crimes of 
armed robbery and attempted murder. Then they assigned a sentence preference for the 
defendant. There were eight different sentences that participants could choose to assign 
the defendant. The sentence selections ranged from no sentence, to probation and 
counseling, to one year in prison and four years probation and counseling, and then to 
prison time ranging from five years up to 25 years (see Appendix 2 for the specific 
measure). After assigning sentence severity participants wrote down their personal 
estimation, on a scale o f zero to one hundred percent, o f whether the defendant would 
commit this type o f crime in the future. On a lined sheet following these measures, 
participants recalled all the facts o f the case they could remember. Following the recall 
portion, participants were asked to provide the five most important pieces o f information 
they used in making their verdict decision. They were asked to rank order the information, 
with one indicating that the piece o f information was most important in making their 
decision and five indicating that it was least important. In the next portion of the 
experiment, participants were asked about particular personality traits Wayne Walker may
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or may not possess. On a scale o f one to seven (one indicating that 'in no way did Wayne 
Walker possess the trait asked about and seven indicating that Wayne Walker very much 
possessed the trait), participants were asked to indicate whether Wayne Walker possessed 
the particular trait. The traits were responsible, honest, sincere, reliable, moral, 
conscientious, and likable. After completing this section, participants filled out what they 
thought this experiment was about. This was an awareness question used to determine 
whether there was a difference between participants who were aware and those who were 
unaware o f the experimental paradigm. The final portion of the response sheet was the 
demographics section.
Design. This experiment was a single factor design. The independent variable was 
the type o f picture viewed for the defendant (i.e., good guy versus bas guy). Within each 
condition there were two pictures (i.e., two pictures o f bad guys and two pictures o f good 
guys). The dependent variables were verdict choice, the probability that the defendant had 
committed the crime, sentence assignment, the probability that the defendant will commit 
the same crime sometime in the future, and recall.
Procedure. Participants, in groups o f one to five people, were assigned randomly 
to view one o f the four versions o f the case file presented on Microsoft PowerPoint. 
Participants were seated in front o f the computer. One volunteer member in the group 
manually advanced each o f the 43 slides. An oral narrative that briefly described the slide 
accompanied each slide. On slides in which witnesses gave statements there was a brief 
description o f what the slide was and then the witness gave the statement (in a separate 
voice from the narrator). To give an example o f these descriptions that follow each slide, 
the following is taken from the slide showing the defendant Wayne Walker while he reads
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Ms deposition. The description says, “This is the defendant Wayne Walker. You will now 
hear a statement from the defendant. Once he is finished please advance to the next slide.”
There were slides in which the judge gave instructions in a separate voice from the 
narrator. Also, there were two slides in which participants viewed a probable cause 
hearing. The probable cause hearing exposed participants to the victim/ witness’ 
testimony o f the armed robbery and attempted murder and their subsequent identification 
o f the defendant. On these two slides were pictures o f the prosecuting attorney, defense 
attorney, the witness to the crime, and the judge. Participants waited until the completion 
o f the narration to advance to the next slide. Participants were only allowed to advance 
the slides; they were not allowed to go back to earlier slides. The final slide instructed 
participants to begin filling out response sheets.
Upon completion of the presentation, participants filled out the response sheets, 
which contained the dependent measures described previously. Participants were not timed 
when filling out the response sheets. Questionnaires were filled out individually without 
deliberation.
Results
There were similar patterns o f results for the two pictures within each condition, 
so the following results were collapsed across photographs within each condition.
Verdict. Regardless o f condition participants overwhelmingly opted to acquît the 
target (see Table 3). There was no difference, however between the conditions, X 2 (1, N
= 93) = .02, pf> .05.
Current and Future Estimation. À repeated measure analysis o f variance was 
performed on the current and future estimations. There was a significant interaction
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between time o f estimation and condition, F (1,91) = 14,89, MSB = 406.44 (p < .01). For 
the current estimation the bad guy was equivalent to the good guy, t (91) = -.80, SE =
6.11 (p = .43; see Table 4), whereas for the future estimation the bad guy was rated as 
being more likely to commit the crimes of armed robbery and attempted murder than the 
good guy, L(91) = 3.08, SE = 5.83 (p < .01; see Table 4).
Sentence Assignment. Sentence assignment was not related to condition (good 
versus bad guy), â f  (7, N = 93) = 11.48, p > .05. The modal sentence assignment in both 
conditions was “No sentence, I would allow him to go free.” Nearly half (48%) of the 
participants in the bad guy condition and nearly two-fifths (38%) of the participants in the 
good guy condition selected this sentence option. The remaining participants in each 
condition were approximately equally distributed across the other seven sentence options 
(see Table 5).
Personality Traits. A one-way multiple analysis o f variance was conducted for 
condition and the seven personality traits o f responsible, honest, sincere, reliable, moral, 
conscientious, and likable (see Table 6). The personality traits o f conscientious and 
reliable were the only traits that showed a significant difference between conditions with 
the bad guy targets receiving considerably lower ratings for these traits, F (1, 91) = 4.61, 
MSE = 1.69 and F (1, 91) = 3.92, MSE = 1.57 (p < .05), respectively; all other F’s < 2.02.
Recall Similar to Experiment 2, recall information and diagnostic information 
were scored using the criterion that the “general meaning” o f a particular behavior had 
been accurately conveyed by the participant (Rothbart, Evans, & Fulero, 1979) and hence, 
a point was given for that recall information. For example, if the participant wrote, “The 
defendant wore a red bandana over Ms mouth,” or “The Nite Owl convenience store was
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robbed,” a point was given.. Diagnostic information was coded for whether it was 
information that would acquit or convict the defendant. For example, if participants wrote 
that the night manager stated the doors had not been cleaned in a few days and the 
fingerprint (one o f the key pieces o f evidence presented by the prosecution) could have 
been from a previous visit by the defendant, the diagnostic information was scored as 
acquitting the defendant. If  participants wrote that the defendant was identified by the 
night manager (i.e. the alleged victim), the diagnostic information was scored as 
convicting the defendant. The total amount o f information recalled was equivalent 
between the bad guy condition (M = 9.10, SD = 4.36) and good guy condition (M= 9.67, 
SD = 5.43); t (91) = 0.55, SE = 1.02. There was no difference between the bad guy 
condition (M = 2.96, SD = 1.79) and good guy condition (M = 2.69, SD = 1.89) in 
information that would acquit the target, t (91) = .71, SE = .38. There was also no 
difference between the bad guy condition (M = .88, SD = 1.72) and good guy condition 
(M = 0.76, SD = 1.42) in diagnostic information that would convict the defendant, t (91)
= .3 6 ,S E =  33 .
Awareness. À large proportion of participants (86%) were not aware of the 
experimental paradigm, i.e. the influence o f the defendants5 picture. Participants who 
indicated that they were aware o f the experimental paradigm (i.e., they were able to 
indicate that experiment had something to do with the appearance o f the defendant) were 
removed and the data were reanalyzed. With aware participants removed, the same 
pattern o f results as prior analysis was obtained for verdict, current and future estimation, 
and recall. Results not containing the aware participants differed from overall results on 
sentence assignment. Without the aware participants, the sentence assigned the target was
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significantly related to condition, X 2 (7. N = 80) = 14.38, p < .05. Nearly half (48%) the 
unaware participants in the bad guy condition chose, “No sentence, I would allow him to 
go free.” The remaining participants in the bad guy condition distributed their sentence 
assignments almost equally across the five other selections and only one person selected 
the harshest sentence o f 20- 25 years in prison. Unlike the bad guy condition where 
sentence assignments, besides the “no sentence” selection, were evenly distributed, 
participants in the good guy condition were more selective in their sentence assignments. 
Nearly two-fifths (38%) o f the unaware participants in the good guy condition chose, “No 
sentence, I would allow him to go free.” Nearly one-fifth (18%) of the remaining 
participants in this group chose the harshest sentence o f 20- 25 years and prison. A small 
minority o f participants (8%) in this group chose the option of 10- 15 years in prison and 
the remaining participants (36%) evenly distributed their selections over the sentences that 
included a period o f probation.
Reanalysis o f the data, after removing aware participants, indicated that only the 
personality trait o f conscientious showed any significant difference between conditions, F 
(1, 78) = 4.70, MSE = 1.80 (p < ,05). All other personality traits were not significant 
between conditions for these reanalyzed data, all other F s  (1, 78) < 1.82. This was unlike 
previous results in which both the personality traits o f responsible and conscientious 
showed significant differences between groups
In analyzing the aware versus the unaware groups, the only difference between 
participants who indicated that they were aware o f the paradigm and those who did not 
was the estimation that the defendant would commit this type o f crime in the future.
There was a marginally significant difference between these two groups, t (91) = 1.83. SE
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= 8.67 (g = .07). The aware group (M = 50.77, SD = 31.68) deemed the target as more 
likely to commit this crime in the future than the unaware group (M = 30.93, SD = 28.55). 
In further analysis o f the aware group (n = 13) on the dependent variable o f future 
estimation, there was a significant difference between the bad guy condition (M = 65.63, 
SD = 30.29) and the good guy condition (M = 27.00, SD = 16.05). Participants in the bad 
guy condition were more likely to rate the target as having a higher probability of 
committing this type o f crime in the future than participants in the good guy condition, t 
(11) = 2.60, S E =  14.84 (p < .05). This pattern o f results was the same for the unaware 
group. As such, awareness o f the experimental paradigm did not influence the pattern of 
results other than that the estimation that the defendant would commit this type o f crime in 
the future was higher for the aware group than for the unaware group.
General Discussion
The hypothesis that faces deemed bad or criminal will elicit different responses 
than faces deemed good or non-criminal has been generally confirmed in several early 
studies (Goldstein, et al., 1984; Saladin, Saper, & Breen, 1988; Shoemaker, et al, 1973; 
Yarmey, 1993). The current experiments substantiate this hypothesis and take it one step 
further to demonstrate that faces deemed bad or criminal elicit prejudice behaviors and 
educe stereotypes which participants can reject or implement depending on the specific 
decision. The current experiments show that individuals have consensual stereotypic 
responses to different faces, but those stereotypes do not influence all types o f decision­
making.
Experiment 3 demonstrated that participants possessed a negative stereotype of 
the bad guy target, as evidenced by the fact that they estimated a higher probability that
25
the bad guy target would commit similar crimes in the future. Nevertheless, they were 
unlikely to convict the bad guy target. Participants in the current experiment were equally 
as likely to convict the bad guy target as the good guy target.
It is reassuring to know that even with a picture of a person previously determined 
as bad by over 80% of the participants in the first experiment, a majority of the 
participants in the third experiment would still not convict the bad guy target given the 
evidence presented. Participants’ overwhelmingly chose the not guilty verdict. This is 
contrary to the admonition given by Goldstein, et a l who noted that their findings 
suggested, “the definite possibility that the degree to which a particular individual’s face 
invites facial stereotyping may influence the outcomes of any legal process in which they 
may become involved” (p. 552). The current results indicate that a “particular individual’s 
face may invite stereotyping,” but that a negative stereotype does not influence the 
outcome o f the legal decision-making in which it is involved.
The results o f this experiment, along with other experiments on facial stereotyping 
(Goldstein, et a l, 1984; Saladin, Saper, & Breen, 1988; Shoemaker, et a l, 1973; Yarmey,
1993), indicate that participants have an automatic stereotypic response to the target 
photograph deemed bad or criminal. This experiment, unlike others, went further and 
showed that participants can disregard this “automatic response”. Participants deemed the 
bad guy target as more likely to commit this type o f crime in the future and as less 
responsible and conscientious than the good guy target, yet they overwhelmingly acquitted 
the defendant regardless o f condition. These results are similar to Devine (1989) who 
examined automatic stereotypic responses in high and low prejudice people. She found 
that all participants elicited these automatic stereotypic responses, but that under
circumstances that allowed controlled processing (i.e., more normal day to day fonctions), 
low-prejudiee people appeared to actively reject the automatic stereotypic responses and 
replaced them with more equality-oriented thoughts. Participants in the present 
experiment exhibited prejudice reactions to the bad guy target, i.e., they were more likely 
to think he would commit this type o f crime in the future, but were unwilling to convict 
the defendant based on the evidence presented. This does not necessarily indicate that 
participants were low prejudice, but rather that they can control the processing of 
information.
Given the results o f Experiment 3, it could be that the experimental conditions 
might have allowed participants to control their information processing. This may have 
not been the case in previous studies on facial stereotyping. One obvious difference 
between the current study and previous studies on facial stereotyping of criminal versus 
non-criminal faces was the use o f a foil criminal case file. These previous studies either did 
not include any sort o f description o f a crime (Goldstein, et al. 1984 & Yarmey, 1993) or 
they included a contrived vignette o f a crime and asked participants to select a picture that 
depicted a person who was most likely to have committed the crime described (Saladin, 
Saper, & Breen, 1988; Shoemaker, et a l, 1973). Contrived vignettes provide minimal 
amounts o f information. As such they diminish an individual’s ability to systematically 
evaluate information and in turn they increase the likelihood that individuals will look to 
other cues for processing, e.g., “the guy looks bad so he must be bad” (Chaiken, 
Liberman, & Eagly, 1989; Petty & Caccioppo, 1989). So, providing participants with 
more information about the case may have enhanced their ability to scrutinize the 
information and weigh both sides o f the case and decreased their likelihood o f utilizing
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peripheral cues to make a decision. It could be that the use o f a more elaborate case file in 
Experiment 3 o f the current study resulted in the finding that people were not so easily 
influenced by the elicitation o f a stereotype, which is contrary to previous findings on 
facial stereotyping.
Another différence between the current experiment and previous experiments on 
facial stereotyping is that the tasks that participants engaged in during previous 
experiments were different than the tasks that participants in the current experiment 
engaged in. Participants in previous experiments simply identified the picture that best 
depicted an individual guilty o f a specific crime or they read a contrived vignette and then 
selected the picture that best depicted an individual guilty o f a specific crime. Participants 
in Experiment 3 o f the present study viewed a foil case file, which included arguments and 
evidence from both the prosecution and defense and within this case file the picture of the 
defendant was embedded amongst other pictures o f other major players in the case. 
Embedding the picture should have lowered the demand characteristics of the current 
experiment compared to previous experiments and as such, participants should have been 
less likely to figure out the experimental paradigm and act according to what they believed 
were the desired results o f the experimenter, i.e. the “good-subject tendency” (McBumey,
1994). Because awareness questions were either never posed to participants or never 
reported, it is difficult to say definitively whether the experimental methods had an 
influence or not.
The current experiment also differed from previous experiments on facial 
stereotyping o f criminals in that the current experiment was more similar than other 
experiments to a real trial. It could be that this led participants .into taking their role as
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decision-makers more seriously than previous experiments. Because of this perception of 
their roles, participants may have engaged in more scrutiny o f the 'information and 
weighed the results o f their actions more seriously when making decisions about the 
defendant.
It could be argued that the failure to find effects of the stereotype on the verdict 
measure indicates ceiling levels o f performance. This argument can be rejected because 
the pattern o f results (no difference between the bad guy and good guy conditions) was 
the same for the two other measures, current probability of guilt and sentence assignment, 
yet there were no ceiling effects on either o f these measures. The overall mean for the 
current probability o f guilt was 3 7  (SD = .29). For sentence assignment nearly half (46%) 
o f all the participants selected sentences that were in. the middle of the scale and not at 
either extreme o f the scale (see Table 5 for results). Furthermore, in earlier pilot studies a 
similar case file was used which yielded conviction rates that were intermediate (overall 
conviction rates for the bad guy and good guy conditions in the pilot studies were 3 6  and 
.42, respectively). However, the principal results were the same as the present 
experiment: there was no effect o f appearance on verdict and the present estimation of 
guilt, but there was a strong effect o f appearance on the future probability of committing a 
similar crime.
The results o f Experiment 3 o f the current study were not congruent with the 
initial hypothesis that participants would be more likely to convict the bad guy than the 
good guy. The results supported the null hypothesis that participants would be equally as 
likely to convict the bad guy as the good guy. Several important factors support the 
acceptance o f the null hypothesis for the results o f Experiment 3. The first factor that
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indicated the results supported the null hypothesis and were not due to remnants of the 
design or stimulus materials was the power o f the test. Given the large number of 
participants, Experiment 3 was powerful enough to detect a difference should there have 
been one, <j) = .96. The second factor that supports the acceptance of the null hypothesis 
was the control exerted over the experimental materials and conditions. Experiment 2 
established that there was a significant difference between the way participants perceived 
the bad and good guy targets. Also, measures within Experiment 3 indicated that 
participants had different perceptions o f the two targets. So, the independent variables, the 
target faces, were distinct enough from one another that participants differentially 
perceived the faces and perceived them as initially hypothesized. In terms of the stimulus 
materials, the case file had been used previously in mock trials that resulted in. half o f the 
juries acquitting and half convicting the defendant (I. A. Tanford, personal communication. 
February 24, 1998). So, the materials were ambiguous enough to maximize the likelihood 
o f finding effects o f the manipulated variable, facial appearance. Participants went 
through the same procedures and were exposed to the same materials across all 
conditions, except for the target picture they viewed. The third factor that supports the 
acceptance o f the null hypothesis is the sensitivity o f the dependent measures. With the 
dependent measure verdict, there is no way to determine whether other researchers had 
obtained comparable results to those in Experiment 3 because this measure had not been 
used in previous experiments. Rather, researchers used ordinal scales to evaluate 
participants’ likelihood o f convicting the defendant. The verdict measure in and of itself is 
not a very sensitive measure and that was why there was a comparable dependent 
measure, current estimation of guilt. One reason the second, more sensitive measure o f
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likelihood to convict was not similar to results in previous research is that it consistently 
came after participants chose their individual verdict (this was done in order to maintain 
ecological validity). Participants simply used their verdict preference as an anchor in 
which to base their current estimation o f guilt. Other dependent measures, such as future 
estimation o f guilt and the personality traits o f reliable and conscientious, indicated 
differences between the two conditions. So, differences in perceptions between the good 
and bad guy targets existed, but how participants acted on those perceptions were counter 
to the initial experimental hypothesis.
The results o f this experiment must be looked at in their entirety. There were 
differential responses depending on condition and differential responses depending on the 
dependent measure. Obtaining different responses to the targets depending on condition 
was expected and even hypothesized, but obtaining different responses to each of the 
dependent measures was not. One possible way to understand the variation between 
dependent measures is to examine the gravity o f the question. It could be argued that the 
gravity o f the question posed to participants elicited varying decision-making operations. 
The measures used in Experiment 3 differed in the direct effect they could have on the 
mock defendants’ life. Verdict was the measure that had the greatest direct effect on the 
defendant, whereas future probability that the defendant would commit the crime had the 
smallest potential impact. Convicting the defendant meant that participants felt the 
defendant was a danger to society and should have Ms freedom revoked in some way. 
This is a very serious consideration knowing the value placed on personal freedom. The 
measure future probability was simply a conjecture that had no impact on the defendant’s 
personal freedom and as such was a less serious decision for participants. Participants
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were not necessarily asked to be jurors, but they were asked to make judgments about the 
defendant, as would jurors. In this situation they may have weighed the direct effects of 
their responses to different measures on the defendant, i.e., choosing guilty would revoke 
the freedom of the defendant, whereas indicating the defendant had a high probability of 
committing the crime in the future would not revoke Ms freedom. So, the more directly a 
measure affected the defendant, i.e., verdict and current estimation, the less impact there 
was o f the stereotype. The less directly a response impacted the defendants’ life, the 
greater impact there was o f the stereotype.
One limiting factor in tMs study was the use o f students, who may be low 
prejudiced individuals. University curriculum and the diversity of the student body at 
Florida International University can potentially attenuate the effects of stereotypes and 
prejudice by merely shedding light on their existence and as Devine (1989) demonstrated 
low prejudice individuals actively reject the automatic elicitation o f a stereotype. It could 
be that merely shedding light on the existence o f stereotypes attenuates the existence of 
stereotypes, which in turn would classify students as low prejudice individuals. The 
majority o f the participants in these experiments were currently enrolled university 
students. The results o f Experiment 3 may simply be a reflection o f a participant pool of 
low prejudiced individuals who rejected the stereotype on more serious questions and 
reflected the influence o f the stereotype on less serious questions. People who are not 
currently enrolled students may be higher prejudiced people because they are not exposed 
to university curricula. It could be that using individuals who are not university students 
might generate different results than those found in this study, i.e., they would be more
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likely to convict the bad guy target and deem it more probable that he committed the 
current crime. Again, this is a separate issue to be looked at in 'future research.
This study takes previous research one step further and looks at the impact of a 
full case file on legal decision-making and criminal appearance. As stated previously, it is 
uplifting to know that people are not so easily influenced by negative stereotypes when 
making decisions that have ramifications on another’s life. All three experiments indicated 
that criminal facial stereotypes exist, but Experiment 3 demonstrated that other factors 
could outweigh the influence o f the negative facial stereotype. This study as other studies 
on jury decision-making indicated that individuals do take these types o f legal decisions 
seriously and are not so easily influenced by the many extra-legal factors that legal 
scholars have for so long cautioned about.
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Appendix 1
Personnel Management Study
Please wait until you have heard instructions from the researcher.
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Response Sheets
On a scale o f 1 to 10 (with 1 indicating that it would be LEAST LIKELY to hire Wayne 
Walker and 10 indicating that you would be MOST LIKELY to Mre Wayne Walker), 
please indicate how likely it would be for you to hire Wayne Walker as a cashier in your 
convenience store. Please circle your choice.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10
Least Most
Likely Likely
In. the following spaces please write down the various pieces o f information you used in 
making your decision. Please write one piece of information in each of the spaces 
provided.
1.
2 .
3.
4.
5.
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When responding to the questions contained in this section, you will be asked to use a scale with 
values ranging from 1 to 7 to rate your opinions. A 1 indicates that you feel Wayne Walker in no 
way possesses the quality asked about. A 7 indicates that Wayne Walker very much possesses the 
quality asked about.
In the following section, please circle the number that best describes your opinion of Wayne 
Walker.
1. How responsible is the employee, Wayne Walker?
1 2  3 4 
Not responsible at all
5 6 7 
Very responsible
2. How honest is the employee, Wayne Walker?
1 2  3 4 
Not honest at all
5 6 7
Very honest
3. How sincere is the employee, Wayne Walker?
1 2  3 4
Not sincere at all
5 6 7
Very sincere
4. How reliable is the employee, Wayne Walker?
1 2  3 4 
Not reliable at all
5 6 7
Very reliable
5. How moral is the employee, Wayne Walker?
1 2  3 4
Not moral at all
5 6 7
Very moral
6. How conscientious is the employee, Wayne Walker?
1 2  3 4
Not conscientious at all
5 6 7 
Very conscientious
7. How likable is the employee, Wayne Walker?
1 2  3 4 
Not likable at all ............_  .
5 6 7
Very likable
39
In your own words, please tell i s  what you think this experiment is about.
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DEMOGRAPHIC INFORMATION
1. Date o f birth: _____ ____
2. Gender;
D  Female 
CUMale
3. Race/Ethnic background;
EH Mon -Hispanic White 
D  Hispanic White 
O w o n  -Hispanic Black 
D  Hispanic Black 
□  Other;
4. Please indicate how much formal education you have received:
EH Less than High School
□  Some High School
[Z3 Received High School Diploma
D Some College
ED Received College Degree
ED Some Post-Graduate
ED Received Post-Graduate Degree
5. Please list your current occupation.
Thank you for your participation in this study.
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Appendix 2
Questionnaire 
Jury Decision-Making Study
Instructions
On the following pages are a number o f questions about the case. Please complete 
this questionnaire independently. We are interested in your opinions and 'impressions.
This is a research project not a test. There are no right or wrong answers. Please 
consider each item carefully, and be as honest as possible in your answers. Please answer 
each question in the order that they appear.
If  you have any questions about these instructions or any other aspect of the 
questionnaire, feel free to ask the researcher. I f  you do not have any questions at this 
moment please turn the page and begin filling out the questionnaire.
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What is your verdict in the case of the State of Columbia vs. Wayne B. Walker? Please 
indicate your choice by circling either verdict.
GUILTY NOT GUILTY
(2) Please provide your personal estimation o f the probability that the defendant did in fact 
commit the crimes o f armed robbery and attempted murder given the set o f evidence you 
just viewed.
Please indicate your personal estimation o f the probability that the defendant is guilty on a 
scale o f 0% to 100%. 0% indicates that there is no likelihood that the defendant did 
commit the crimes o f armed robbery and attempted murder and 100% 'indicates that it is 
certain that the defendant did commit these crimes.
%
(3) The maximum sentence for the crime in. this case (armed robbery and attempted 
murder) is 25 years in prison. If  you could assign the sentence, what sentence would 
you give Wayne Walker, the defendant? Please mark your sentence preference in the 
space provided.
 20 to 25 years in prison
 15 to 20 years in prison
 ____ 10 to 15 years in prison
_____ 5 to 10 years in prison
 ____1 year in prison and four years probation and counseling
 5 years probation and counseling
 __ _One year probation only
No sentence, I would allow him to go free
(4) Please provide your personal estimation o f the probability that the defendant will 
commit this type o f crime in the future.
Please indicate your personal estimation on a scale o f 0% to 100%. 0% indicates that 
there is no likelihood that the defendant will commit these types o f crimes in the future and 
100% indicates that it is certain that the defendant will most definitely commit these types 
o f crimes in the .future.
%
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(5) Please list all the facts in the case that you can remember. Please list the facts on the 
lines provided below and on the back i f  needed.
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In the following spaces please write down the top five most important pieces of 
information you used in making your verdict decision. Please write one piece of 
information in each o f the spaces provided. Then rank the pieces of information, on a 
scale o f 1 through 5, on their importance in helping you make a verdict decision. A wl ” 
indicates that this piece o f information was most im portant and “5” indicates that this 
information was the least im portant o f you top five pieces of information.
1.
2 .
3.
4.
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When responding to the questions contained in this section you will be asked to use a scale with 
values ranging from 1 to 7 to rate your opinions. A “ 1” indicates that you feel Wayne Walker 
in no way possesses the quality asked about in the question and a “7” indicates that Wayne 
Walker very much possesses the quality asked about.
In the following section, please circle the number that best describes your opinion Wayne 
Walker.
8. How responsible is Wayne Walker?
1 2  3 
Not responsible at all
4 5 6 7 
Very responsible
9. How honest is Wayne Walker?
1 2 3
Not honest at all
4 5 6 7
Very honest
10. How sincere is Wayne Walker?
1 2 3
Not sincere at all
4 5 6 7
Very sincere
11. How reliable is Wayne Walker?
1 2  3 
Not reliable at all
4 5 6 7
Very reliable
12. How moral is Wayne Walker?
1 2 3 
Not moral at all
4 5 6 7
Very moral
13. How conscientious is Wayne Walker?
1 2 3 
Not conscientious at all
4 5 6 7 
Very conscientious
14. How likable is Wayne Walker?
1 2 3 
Not likable at all
4 5 6 7
Very likable
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DEMOGRAPHIC INFORMATION
5. Date o f birth;____________ ______
6 . Gender:
□  Female
n.Male
7. Race/Ethnic background:
O N on-H ispanic White 
EH Hispanic White 
ONon-Hispanic Black 
O  Hispanic Black 
O  Other:
8, Please indicate how much formal education you have received: 
D  Less than High School 
□  Some High School 
EH Received High School Diploma 
EH Some College 
EH Received College Degree 
EH Some Post-Graduate 
EH Received Post-Graduate Degree
6. Please list your current occupation.
Thank you for your participation in this study.
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DEBRIEFING
This page is to be used during the debriefing section of the experiment. Ask these 
questions out loud in the order presented and record the answers in the space provided. 
Please do not hand this page to participants.
1. In your own words, describe what you feel this experiment is about.
2. Do you think the way the defendant looks in any way influenced your verdict decision?
YES NO
3. Explain experimental paradigm to participants. Ask if they have any questions and 
thank them for their time when you are finished.
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Figure 1. Target Pictures Obtained in Experiment 1
Bad Guvs
Picture 10 Picture 20
Good Guvs
Picture 48 Picture 15
Mixed/
Picture Good Bad undetermined
10 .07 .83 .10
20 .03 .80 .17
15 .66 .03 .37
48 .66 .17 .23
Overall ,19(SD = .20) ,40(SD = .13) ,41(SD = .20)
Table 1. Proportion o f  Good. Bad and Mixed Responses to Pictures Selected in Experiment 1
Ig M e ^ -Personaüty ..Trait Means by Condition in Experiment 2
Bad Guya Good Guyb
Trait M M M SD F ( L 28),
Responsible 3.60 0.99 4.06 1.18 1.08
Honest 4.07 1.22 3.63 1.20 0.70
Sincere 4.20 1.08 3.75 1.24 1.59
Reliable 3.40 1.12 3.94 1.53 1.03
Moral 4.00 0.88 3.75 1.00 0.69
Conscientious 4.00 1.13 3.88 1.26 1.16
Likable 3.80 1.52 3.88 1.03 0.04
a n =  14 
b n = 16
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Verdict
Condition n   Guilty______Not guilty
Bad Guy
Good Guy
Table 3. Proportion o f Verdict Choices bv Condition in Experiment 3
48 .19 .81
45 .18 .82
Estimation
Table 4. Current and Future Estimates by Condition In Experiment 3
Condition Current SD Future SD
Bad Guy 34.58 32.54 45.83 30.04
Good Guy 39.44 25.74 27.87 25.82
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Table 5. Proportion of Sentence Assignments by Condition in Experiment 3 
Sentence Assigned Bad Guy Good Guy
20 to 25 years in prison .04 .18
15 to 20 years in prison .04 .02
10 to 15 years in prison .08 .07
5 to 10 years in prison .10 .00
1 year in prison and 4
years probation and counseling .08 .18
5 years probation and counseling .06 .09
One year probation only .10 .09
No sentence, I would allow him
to go free -48 -38
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Trait
Bad Guy E Good G uyb
F (1,91M SD M SD
Responsible 3.40 1.28 3.91 1.22 3.92*
Honest 3.90 1 ^1 i . J l 4.31 1.29 2.02
Sincere 3.83 1.60 4.27 1.44 1.88
Reliable 3.67 1.40 3.76 1.38 0.09
Moral 3.29 1.15 3.56 1.37 1.02
Conscientious 3.35 1.16 3.93 1.44 4.61*
Likable 3.50 1.37 3.87 1.41 1.62
Note. Judgements were made on 7-point scales (1 -  target in no way possesses trait, 7 target 
very much possesses the trait 
a n = 48 
b n = 45 
* p < .05
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